Main index | Section 8 | Options |
Alternatively, to load the GEOM_ELI module at boot time, add the following line to your loader.conf(5):
geom_eli_load="YES"
Usage of the
geli
utility:
geli
init
[
geli
label - an alias for
init
geli
attach
[
geli
detach
[
geli
stop - an alias for
detach
geli
onetime
[
geli
configure
[
geli
setkey
[
geli
delkey
[
geli
kill
[
geli
backup
[
geli
restore
[
geli
suspend
[
geli
resume
[
geli
resize
[
geli
version
[prov ...]
geli
clear
[
geli
dump
[
geli
list
geli
status
geli
load
geli
unload
The following is a list of the most important features:
2898, RFC, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification, Version 2.0.,
,The first argument to geli indicates an action to be performed:
init |
Initialize providers which need to be encrypted.
If multiple providers are listed as arguments, they will all be initialized
with the same passphrase and/or User Key.
A unique salt will be randomly generated for each provider to ensure the
Master Key for each is unique.
Here you can set up the cryptographic algorithm to use, Data Key length,
etc.
The last sector of the providers is used to store metadata.
The
init
subcommand also automatically writes metadata backups to
/var/backups/<prov>.eli
file.
The metadata can be recovered with the
restore
subcommand described below.
Additional options include: |
| Enable data integrity verification (authentication) using the given algorithm. This will reduce the size of storage available and also reduce speed. For example, when using 4096 bytes sector and HMAC/SHA256 algorithm, 89% of the original provider storage will be available for use. Currently supported algorithms are: HMAC/MD5, HMAC/SHA1, HMAC/RIPEMD160, HMAC/SHA256, HMAC/SHA384 and HMAC/SHA512. If the option is not given, there will be no authentication, only encryption. The recommended algorithm is HMAC/SHA256. |
| Try to decrypt this partition during boot, before the root partition is mounted. This makes it possible to use an encrypted root partition. One will still need bootable unencrypted storage with a /boot/ directory, which can be a CD-ROM disc or USB pen-drive, that can be removed after boot. |
| |
File name to use for metadata backup instead of the default /var/backups/<prov>.eli. To inhibit backups, you can use none as the backupfile. If multiple providers were initialized in the one command, you can use PROV (all upper-case) in the file name, and it will be replaced with the provider name. If PROV is not found in the file name and multiple providers were initialized in the one command, -<prov> will be appended to the end of the file name specified. | |
| When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo ‘*’ characters. This makes the length of the passphrase visible. |
| Encryption algorithm to use. Currently supported algorithms are: AES-XTS, AES-CBC, Blowfish-CBC, Camellia-CBC, 3DES-CBC, and NULL. The default and recommended algorithm is AES-XTS. NULL is unencrypted. |
| Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem. The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads loader(8) from the encrypted partition. |
| |
Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2 when processing User Key passphrase component. If this option is not specified, geli will find the number of iterations which is equal to 2 seconds of crypto work. If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used. PKCS#5v2 processing is performed once, after all parts of the passphrase component have been read. | |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key
(or part of it).
If
newpassfile
is given as -, standard input will be used.
Only the first line (excluding new-line character) is taken from the given file.
This argument can be specified multiple times, which has the effect of
reassembling a single passphrase split across multiple files.
Cannot be combined with the
| |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key (or part of it). If newkeyfile is given as -, standard input will be used. This argument can be specified multiple times, which has the effect of reassembling a single keyfile split across multiple keyfile parts. | |
| Data Key length to use with the given cryptographic algorithm. If the length is not specified, the selected algorithm uses its default key length. |
AES-XTS | 128, 256 |
AES-CBC | 128, 192, 256 |
Blowfish-CBC | 128 + n * 32, for n=[0..10] |
3DES-CBC | 192 |
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key.
Cannot be combined with the
|
| Change decrypted provider's sector size. Increasing the sector size allows increased performance, because encryption/decryption which requires an initialization vector is done per sector; fewer sectors means less computational work. |
| Don't pass through BIO_DELETE calls (i.e., TRIM/UNMAP). This can prevent an attacker from knowing how much space you're actually using and which sectors contain live data, but will also prevent the backing store (SSD, etc) from reclaiming space you're not using, which may degrade its performance and lifespan. The underlying provider may or may not actually obliterate the deleted sectors when TRIM is enabled, so it should not be considered to add any security. |
| Metadata version to use. This option is helpful when creating a provider that may be used by older FreeBSD/GELI versions. Consult the HISTORY section to find which metadata version is supported by which FreeBSD version. Note that using an older version of metadata may limit the number of features available. |
attach |
Attach the given providers.
The encrypted Master Keys are loaded from the metadata and decrypted
using the given passphrase/keyfile and new GEOM providers are created
using the specified provider names.
A
".eli"
suffix is added to the user specified provider names.
Multiple providers can only be attached with a single
attach
command if they all have the same passphrase and keyfiles.
Additional options include: |
| Do a dry-run decryption. This is useful to verify passphrase and keyfile without decrypting the device. |
|
If specified, the decrypted providers are detached automatically on last close,
so the user does not have to remember to detach
providers after unmounting the filesystems.
This only works when providers were opened for writing, and will not work if
the filesystems on the providers were mounted read-only.
Probably a better choice is the
|
| |
Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to use (could be 0 or 1). If the index number is not provided all keys will be tested. | |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key
(or part of it).
For more information see the description of the
| |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key
(or part of it).
For more information see the description of the
| |
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Keys.
Cannot be combined with the
|
| Attach read-only providers. They are not opened for writing. |
detach |
Detach the given providers, which means remove the devfs entry
and clear the Master Key and Data Keys from memory.
Additional options include: |
| |
Force detach - detach even if the provider is open. | |
| |
Mark provider to detach on last close, after the last filesystem has been unmounted. If this option is specified, the provider will not be detached while it is open, but will be automatically detached when it is closed for the last time even if it was only opened for reading. | |
onetime | |
Attach the given providers with a random, one-time (ephemeral) Master Key.
The command can be used to encrypt swap partitions or temporary filesystems.
Additional options include: | |
| Enable data integrity verification (authentication). For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. |
| Encryption algorithm to use. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. |
| Detach on last close, after the last filesystem has been unmounted. Note: this option is not usable for temporary filesystems as the provider is detached after the filesystem has been created. It still can, and should, be used for swap partitions. For more information, see the description of the attach subcommand. |
| |
Data Key length to use with the given cryptographic algorithm. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. | |
| |
Change decrypted provider's sector size. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. | |
| Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. |
configure |
Change configuration of the given providers.
Additional options include: |
| |
Set the BOOT flag on the given providers. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. | |
| |
Remove the BOOT flag from the given providers. | |
| |
When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo ‘*’ characters. This makes the length of the passphrase visible. | |
| |
Disable echoing of any characters when a passphrase is entered to boot from this encrypted root filesystem. This hides the passphrase length. | |
| |
Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem. The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads loader(8) from the encrypted partition. | |
| |
Deactivate booting from this encrypted root partition. | |
| |
Enable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. For more information, see the description of the init subcommand. | |
| |
Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. | |
setkey | |
Install a copy of the Master Key into the selected slot, encrypted with
a new User Key.
If the selected slot is populated, replace the existing copy.
A provider has one Master Key, which can be stored in one or both slots,
each encrypted with an independent User Key.
With the
init
subcommand, only key number 0 is initialized.
The User Key can be changed at any time: for an attached provider,
for a detached provider, or on the backup file.
When a provider is attached, the user does not have to provide
an existing passphrase/keyfile.
Additional options include: | |
| |
Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2. If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used. To be able to use this option with the setkey subcommand, only one key has to be defined and this key must be changed. | |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of a current User Key (or part of it). | |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the new User Key (or part of it). | |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of a current User Key (or part of it). | |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the new User Key (or part of it). | |
| Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to change (could be 0 or 1). If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key used for attaching the provider will be changed. If the provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file) and no key number is given, the first Master Key copy to be successfully decrypted with the provided User Key passphrase/keyfile will be changed. |
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the current User Key.
Cannot be combined with the
|
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the new User Key.
Cannot be combined with the
|
delkey |
Destroy (overwrite with random data) the selected Master Key copy.
If one is destroying keys for an attached provider, the provider
will not be detached even if all copies of the Master Key are destroyed.
It can even be rescued with the
setkey
subcommand because the Master Key is still in memory.
Additional options include: |
|
Destroy all copies of the Master Key (does not need
|
| Force key destruction. This option is needed to destroy the last copy of the Master Key. |
| |
Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy. If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key used for attaching the provider will be destroyed. If provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file) the key number has to be given. | |
kill |
This command should be used only in emergency situations.
It will destroy all copies of the Master Key on a given provider and will
detach it forcibly (if it is attached).
This is absolutely a one-way command - if you do not have a metadata
backup, your data is gone for good.
In case the provider was attached with the
Additional options include: |
| |
If specified, all currently attached providers will be killed. | |
backup | |
Backup metadata from the given provider to the given file. | |
restore | |
Restore metadata from the given file to the given provider.
Additional options include: | |
| |
Metadata contains the size of the provider to ensure that the correct
partition or slice is attached.
If an attempt is made to restore metadata to a provider that has a different
size,
geli
will refuse to restore the data unless the
| |
suspend | |
Suspend device by waiting for all inflight requests to finish, clearing all
sensitive information such as the Master Key and Data Keys from kernel memory,
and blocking all further I/O requests until the
resume
subcommand is executed.
This functionality is useful for laptops.
Suspending a laptop should not leave an encrypted device attached.
The
suspend
subcommand can be used rather than closing all files and directories from
filesystems on the encrypted device, unmounting the filesystem, and
detaching the device.
Any access to the encrypted device will be blocked until the Master Key is
reloaded through the
resume
subcommand.
Thus there is no need to close nor unmount anything.
The
suspend
subcommand does not work with devices created with the
onetime
subcommand.
Please note that sensitive data might still be present in memory locations
such as the filesystem cache after suspending an encrypted device.
Additional options include: | |
| |
Suspend all geli devices. | |
resume | |
Resume previously suspended device.
The caller must ensure that executing this subcommand does not access the
suspended device, leading to a deadlock.
For example, suspending a device which contains the filesystem where the
geli
utility is stored is a bad idea.
Additional options include: | |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key,
or part of it.
For more information see the description of the
| |
| |
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key,
or part of it.
For more information see the description of the
| |
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key.
Cannot be combined with the
|
resize |
Inform
geli
that the provider has been resized.
The old metadata block is relocated to the correct position at the end of the
provider and the provider size is updated.
Additional options include: |
| |
The size of the provider before it was resized. | |
version |
If no arguments are given, the
version
subcommand will print the version of
geli
userland utility as well as the version of the
ELI
GEOM class.
If GEOM providers are specified, the version subcommand will print metadata version used by each of them. |
clear | Clear metadata from the given providers. WARNING: This will erase with zeros the encrypted Master Key copies stored in the metadata. |
dump | Dump metadata stored on the given providers. |
list | See geom(8). |
status | See geom(8). |
load | See geom(8). |
unload | See geom(8). |
Additional options include:
| |
Be more verbose. | |
kern.geom.eli.version | |
Version number of the ELI GEOM class. | |
kern.geom.eli.debug: 0 | |
Debug level of the ELI GEOM class. This can be set to a number between 0 and 3 inclusive. If set to 0, minimal debug information is printed. If set to 3, the maximum amount of debug information is printed. | |
kern.geom.eli.tries: 3 | |
Number of times a user is asked for the passphrase. This is only used for providers which are attached on boot, before the root filesystem is mounted. If set to 0, attaching providers on boot will be disabled. This variable should be set in /boot/loader.conf. | |
kern.geom.eli.overwrites: 5 | |
Specifies how many times the Master Key is overwritten with random values when it is destroyed. After this operation it is filled with zeros. | |
kern.geom.eli.visible_passphrase: 0 | |
If set to 1, the passphrase entered on boot will be visible. This alternative should be used with caution as the entered passphrase can be logged and exposed via dmesg(8). This variable should be set in /boot/loader.conf. | |
kern.geom.eli.threads: 0 | |
Specifies how many kernel threads should be used for doing software cryptography. Its purpose is to increase performance on SMP systems. If set to 0, a CPU-pinned thread will be started for every active CPU. | |
kern.geom.eli.batch: 0 | |
When set to 1, can speed-up crypto operations by using batching. Batching reduces the number of interrupts by responding to a group of crypto requests with one interrupt. The crypto card and the driver has to support this feature. | |
kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit: 8192 | |
Specifies how many Data Keys to cache. The default limit (8192 keys) will allow caching of all keys for a 4TB provider with 512 byte sectors and will take around 1MB of memory. | |
kern.geom.eli.key_cache_hits | |
Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was already in cache. This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than the limit specified in kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit. | |
kern.geom.eli.key_cache_misses | |
Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was not in cache. This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than the limit specified in kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit. | |
# dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/da2.key bs=64 count=1 # geli init -s 4096 -K /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach -k /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da2.eli bs=1m # newfs /dev/da2.eli # mount /dev/da2.eli /mnt/secret amp;... # umount /mnt/secret # geli detach da2.eli
Create an encrypted provider, but use two User Keys: one for your employee and one for you as the company's security officer (so it is not a tragedy if the employee "accidentally" forgets his passphrase):
# geli init /dev/da2 Enter new passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase) Reenter new passphrase: # geli setkey -n 1 /dev/da2 Enter passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase) Enter new passphrase: (let your employee enter his passphrase ...) Reenter new passphrase: (... twice)
You are the security officer in your company. Create an encrypted provider for use by the user, but remember that users forget their passphrases, so backup the Master Key with your own random key:
# dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` bs=64 count=1 # geli init -P -K /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e # geli backup /dev/ada0s1e /mnt/pendrive/backups/`hostname` (use key number 0, so the encrypted Master Key will be re-encrypted by this) # geli setkey -n 0 -k /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e (allow the user to enter his passphrase) Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase:
Encrypted swap partition setup:
# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/ada0s1b bs=1m # geli onetime -d -e 3des ada0s1b # swapon /dev/ada0s1b.eli
The example below shows how to configure two providers which will be attached on boot, before the root filesystem is mounted. One of them is using passphrase and three keyfile parts and the other is using only a keyfile in one part:
# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0 bs=1m # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key0 bs=32k count=1 # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key1 bs=32k count=1 # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key2 bs=32k count=1 # geli init -b -K /boot/keys/da0.key0 -K /boot/keys/da0.key1 -K /boot/keys/da0.key2 da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da1s3a bs=1m # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da1s3a.key bs=128k count=1 # geli init -b -P -K /boot/keys/da1s3a.key da1s3a
The providers are initialized, now we have to add these lines to /boot/loader.conf:
geli_da0_keyfile0_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile0_type="da0:geli_keyfile0" geli_da0_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da0.key0" geli_da0_keyfile1_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile1_type="da0:geli_keyfile1" geli_da0_keyfile1_name="/boot/keys/da0.key1" geli_da0_keyfile2_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile2_type="da0:geli_keyfile2" geli_da0_keyfile2_name="/boot/keys/da0.key2"geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_load="YES" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile0" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key"
If there is only one keyfile, the index might be omitted:
geli_da1s3a_keyfile_load="YES" geli_da1s3a_keyfile_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile" geli_da1s3a_keyfile_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key"
By convention, these loader variables are called geli_< device>_load.However, the actual name prefix before _load, _type, or _name does not matter. At boot time, the geli module searches through all <prefix>_type-likevariables that have a value of "< device>:geli_keyfile".The paths to keyfiles are then extracted from < prefix>_namevariables. In the example above, prefix is "geli_da1s3a_keyfile".
Not only configure encryption, but also data integrity verification using HMAC/SHA256.
# geli init -a hmac/sha256 -s 4096 /dev/da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach /dev/da0 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0.eli bs=1m # newfs /dev/da0.eli # mount /dev/da0.eli /mnt/secret
geli writes the metadata backup by default to the /var/backups/<prov>.eli file. If the metadata is lost in any way (e.g., by accidental overwrite), it can be restored. Consider the following situation:
# geli init /dev/da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase:Metadata backup can be found in /var/backups/da0.eli and can be restored with the following command:
# geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0
# geli clear /dev/da0 # geli attach /dev/da0 geli: Cannot read metadata from /dev/da0: Invalid argument. # geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0 # geli attach /dev/da0 Enter passphrase:
If an encrypted filesystem is extended, it is necessary to relocate and update the metadata:
# gpart create -s GPT ada0 # gpart add -s 1g -t freebsd-ufs -i 1 ada0 # geli init -K keyfile -P ada0p1 # gpart resize -s 2g -i 1 ada0 # geli resize -s 1g ada0p1 # geli attach -k keyfile -p ada0p1
Initialize provider with the passphrase split into two files. The provider can be attached using those two files or by entering "foobar" as the passphrase at the geli prompt:
# echo foo > da0.pass0 # echo bar > da0.pass1 # geli init -J da0.pass0 -J da0.pass1 da0 # geli attach -j da0.pass0 -j da0.pass1 da0 # geli detach da0 # geli attach da0 Enter passphrase: foobar
Suspend all geli devices on a laptop, suspend the laptop, then resume devices one by one after resuming the laptop:
# geli suspend -a # zzz <resume your laptop> # geli resume -p -k keyfile gpt/secret # geli resume gpt/private Enter passphrase:
To create a geli encrypted filesystem with a file as storage device follow this example. First a file named private0 is created in /usr and attached as a memory disk like /dev/md0 for example.
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/usr/private0 bs=1m count=256 # chmod 0600 /usr/private0 # mdconfig -t vnode -f /usr/private0
It is recommended to place the following line in rc.conf(5) to have the memory disk automatically created during boot.
mdconfig_md0="-t vnode -f /usr/private0"
After /dev/md0 is created a random key has to be generated and stored in a secure location, like /root for example. This key should be protected by a passphrase, which is requested when geli init is called.
# dd if=/dev/random of=/root/private0.key bs=64 count=1 # geli init -K /root/private0.key -s 4096 /dev/md0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach -k /root/private0.key /dev/md0 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/md0.eli bs=1m
Once the initialization of the /dev/md0.eli device is ready create a UFS filesystem and mount it for example in /private.
# newfs /dev/md0.eli # mount /dev/md0.eli /private
After a system reboot the geli device can be mounted again with the following commands. The call of geli attach will ask for the passphrase. It is recommended to do this procedure after the boot, because otherwise the boot process would be waiting for the passphrase input.
# geli attach -k /root/private0.key /dev/md0 Enter passphrase: # mount /dev/md0.eli /private
It is recommended to write to the whole provider before first use, in order to make sure that all sectors and their corresponding checksums are properly initialized into a consistent state. One can safely ignore data authentication errors that occur immediately after the first time a provider is attached and before it is initialized in this way.
Highest GELI metadata version supported by the given FreeBSD version:
FreeBSD | GELI |
version | version
|
6.0 | 0 |
6.1 | 0 |
6.2 | 3 |
6.3 | 3 |
6.4 | 3
|
7.0 | 3 |
7.1 | 3 |
7.2 | 3 |
7.3 | 3 |
7.4 | 3
|
8.0 | 3 |
8.1 | 3 |
8.2 | 5
|
9.0 | 6
|
10.0 | 7 |
GELI (8) | October 15, 2020 |
Main index | Section 8 | Options |
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