| Main index | Section 8 | 日本語 | Options |
sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from /etc/rc.d/sshd. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange.
sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.amp; /usr/sbin/sshd.
The options are as follows:
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| Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only. | |
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| Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only. | |
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|
Specify the connection parameters to use for the
| |
| | |
|
Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify
sshd
during key exchange.
The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the
| |
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| When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd. | |
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|
Debug mode.
The server sends verbose debug output to standard error,
and does not put itself in the background.
The server also will not
fork(2)
and will only process one connection.
This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
Multiple
| |
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| Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log. | |
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| Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. | |
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| Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is /etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no configuration file. | |
| | |
| Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. | |
| | |
| Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key. It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different host key algorithms. | |
| | |
| Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). | |
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| Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5). | |
| | |
| Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports. | |
| | |
| Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. | |
| | |
|
Extended test mode.
Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
to stdout and then exit.
Optionally,
Match
rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
| |
| | |
| Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as configuration options may change. | |
| | |
|
This option is used to specify the size of the field
in the
utmp
structure that holds the remote host name.
If the resolved host name is longer than
len,
the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
This allows hosts with very long host names that
overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
Specifying
| |
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication.
Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups amp;. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( ‘amp;*LKamp;*’ on Solaris and UnixWare, ‘amp;*’ on HP-UX, containing ‘Nologin’ on Tru64, a leading ‘amp;*LOCKEDamp;*’ on FreeBSD and a leading ‘amp;!’ on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg ‘NP’ or ‘amp;*NPamp;*’ ).
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel.
After this, the client either requests an interactive shell or execution
or a non-interactive command, which
sshd
will execute via the user's shell using its
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit.
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to:
if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi
If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
| sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com | |
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 | |
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 | |
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 | |
| sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com | |
| ssh-ed25519 | |
| ssh-dss | |
| ssh-rsa | |
The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key).
Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ecdsa_sk.pub, id_ed25519.pub, id_ed25519_sk.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it.
sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive):
| agent-forwarding | |
| Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the restrict option. | |
| cert-authority | |
|
Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is
trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication.
Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. | |
| command="command" | |
|
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
authentication.
The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
otherwise it is run without a tty.
If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
one must not request a pty or should specify
no-pty.
A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the restrict key option. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive. If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the two commands are identical. | |
| environment="NAME=value" | |
| Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. | |
| expiry-time="timespec" | |
| Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD[Z] date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] time. Dates and times will be interpreted in the system time zone unless suffixed by a Z character, in which case they will be interpreted in the UTC time zone. | |
| from="pattern-list" | |
|
Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
comma-separated list of patterns.
See PATTERNS in
ssh_config(5)
for more information on patterns.
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). | |
| no-agent-forwarding | |
| Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. | |
| no-port-forwarding | |
| Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option. | |
| no-pty | |
| Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). | |
| no-user-rc | |
| Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc. | |
| no-X11-forwarding | |
| Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. | |
| permitlisten="[host:]port" | |
|
Limit remote port forwarding with the
ssh(1)
| |
| permitopen="host:port" | |
|
Limit local port forwarding with the
ssh(1)
| |
| port-forwarding | |
| Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the restrict option. | |
| principals="principals" | |
| On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the cert-authority option. | |
| pty | Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the restrict option. |
| no-touch-required | |
| Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made using this key. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk. | |
| verify-required | |
| Require that signatures made using this key attest that they verified the user, e.g. via a PIN. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk. | |
| restrict | |
| Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of ~/.ssh/rc. If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files, they will be included in this set. | |
| tunnel="n" | |
| Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. | |
| user-rc | |
| Enables execution of ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the restrict option. | |
| X11-forwarding | |
| Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the restrict option. | |
An example authorized_keys file:
# Comments are allowed at start of line. Blank lines are allowed. # Plain key, no restrictions ssh-rsa ... # Forced command, disable PTY and all forwarding restrict,command="dump /home" ssh-rsa ... # Restriction of ssh -L forwarding destinations permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa ... # Restriction of ssh -R forwarding listeners permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitlisten="[::1]:22000" ssh-rsa ... # Configuration for tunnel forwarding tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa ... # Override of restriction to allow PTY allocation restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa ... # Allow FIDO key without requiring touch no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ... # Require user-verification (e.g. PIN or biometric) for FIDO key verify-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ... # Trust CA key, allow touch-less FIDO if requested in certificate cert-authority,no-touch-required,principals="user_a" ssh-rsa ...
Each line in these files contains the following fields: marker (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields are separated by spaces.
The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of "@cert-authority", to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or "@revoked", to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line.
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (‘*’ and ‘amp;?’ act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using HostbasedAuthentication, this will be the canonical client host name. When ssh(1) is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given by the user, the value of the ssh(1) HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the ssh(1) CanonicalizeHostname option was used.
A pattern may also be preceded by ‘amp;!’ to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within ‘amp;[’ and ‘amp;]’ brackets then followed by ‘amp;:’ and a non-standard port number.
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a ‘|’ character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub. The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
Lines starting with ‘#’ and empty lines are ignored as comments.
When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the "@cert-authority" marker described above.
The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the "@revoked" marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from ssh(1) when they are encountered.
It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking, for example, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations.
An example ssh_known_hosts file:
# Comments allowed at start of line cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
| ~/.hushlogin | |
|
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
/etc/motd,
if
PrintLastLog
and
PrintMotd,
respectively,
are enabled.
It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
Banner.
| |
| ~/.rhosts | |
|
This file is used for host-based authentication (see
ssh(1)
for more information).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
sshd
reads it as root.
Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended
permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
| |
| ~/.shosts | |
|
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.rhosts,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
| |
| ~/.ssh/ | |
|
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.
There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
| |
| ~/.ssh/authorized_keys | |
|
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described above.
The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to "no".
| |
| ~/.ssh/environment | |
|
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
‘#’),
and assignment lines of the form name=value.
The file should be writable
only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
Environment processing is disabled by default and is
controlled via the
PermitUserEnvironment
option.
| |
| ~/.ssh/known_hosts | |
|
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
can, but need not be, world-readable.
| |
| ~/.ssh/rc | |
|
Contains initialization routines to be run before
the user's home directory becomes accessible.
This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
readable by anyone else.
| |
| /etc/hosts.allow
/etc/hosts.deny | |
|
Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
Further details are described in
hosts_access(5).
| |
| /etc/hosts.equiv | |
|
This file is for host-based authentication (see
ssh(1)).
It should only be writable by root.
| |
| /etc/moduli | |
|
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
key exchange method.
The file format is described in
moduli(5).
If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will
be used.
| |
| /etc/motd | |
|
See
motd(5).
| |
| /etc/nologin | |
|
If this file exists,
sshd
refuses to let anyone except root log in.
The contents of the file
are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
refused.
The file should be world-readable.
| |
| /etc/shosts.equiv | |
|
This file is used in exactly the same way as
hosts.equiv,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
| |
| /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key | |
|
These files contain the private parts of the host keys.
These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
accessible to others.
Note that
sshd
does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
| |
| /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub | |
|
These files contain the public parts of the host keys.
These files should be world-readable but writable only by
root.
Their contents should match the respective private parts.
These files are not
really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
These files are created using
ssh-keygen(1).
| |
| /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts | |
|
Systemwide list of known host keys.
This file should be prepared by the
system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
organization.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
should be world-readable.
| |
| /etc/ssh/sshd_config | |
|
Contains configuration data for
sshd.
The file format and configuration options are described in
sshd_config(5).
| |
| /etc/ssh/sshrc | |
|
Similar to
~/.ssh/rc,
it can be used to specify
machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
| |
| /var/empty | |
|
chroot(2)
directory used by
sshd
during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
and not group or world-writable.
| |
| /var/run/sshd.pid | |
| Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. | |
| SSHD (8) | $Mdocdate: September 11 2022 $ |
| Main index | Section 8 | 日本語 | Options |
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